Early Buddhism as a Unifying Philosophy, by Robert T. Kelley

Robert Kelley
Indian Philosophy
12 May 1998 (revised 12/24-30/99)

Early Buddhism as a Unifying Philosophy

"Philosophy is the organization of real experiences into a coherent, systematic whole, the significance of which is best understood in its historical context." Interpreting Early Buddhist philosophy in terms of this definition poses several problems. Whereas previous philosophical traditions in India tended towards monism or belief in one eternal and perfect controlling force as the true source of all of mankind's "real experiences," the Buddha rejected any metaphysical organizations of ontology because they are not themselves part of our "real experiences." The only organizing factor in Early Buddhism that functions in the least as a unifier for experience is Siddhartha's theory of causation. However, this theory, as will be seen, may not properly fill the role of systematizing the conglomerate of "real experiences." The organization of the real experiences of mortality, suffering, and the absence of a personally empirically verifiable permanent force into an ontological system represents perhaps the most important development in Indian Philosophy. The consequent objectives of human life and ethical ideals represent the Buddha's attempt at organization of the whole of human existence without speculation outside of human existence.

The "historical context" of the Buddhist philosophy is one of extremes in viewpoint. Among the philosophies of the methods for gaining the highest knowledge Siddhartha explored in depth all of the three prevalent at the time. Traditionalists emphasized reliance on scripture and doctrine for the understanding of higher knowledge. Rationalists preferred to understand things in terms of logical arguments based on generally accepted basic axioms and precepts. Empiricists did not necessarily deny the knowledge arrived at from either method, but believed that true knowledge only came from practice, and anything derived from scripture or reason was secondary to the experiential knowledge. Two extant theories of causation that Siddhartha learned about were also polar opposites. The first, self causation, understood all occurrences in terms of the dharma or duty instilled by the immortal force in all things. According to this philosophy, if one thinks one is the real doer of an action, one "is deluded by egoism" (Deutch, Bhagavad-Gita, III:27, p. 50). Thus, the human performing deeds in the world is always acting as an expression of the divine will or internal creative force, and the effects are entirely subject to the intention of the divine working through the human's immortal soul. The opposing idea is that of external causation, where humans are necessarily bound by the natural law of reality functioning as a set pattern of causes and effects. Because, according to this theory, the rules of cause and effect entirely determine all phenomena in the world, external causation denies idealistic metaphysics, free will, consciousness, and renders morality and spirituality meaningless. Finally, the two opposing ontological philosophies Siddhartha tried to verify in his studies were the monistic conception of reality as manifestation of a small part of the divine eternal ultimate reality, and the existential denial of anything but human experience and mortal life as reality.

In pursuing the paths of knowledge that existed in India at the time, Siddhartha sought teacher after teacher, but eventually rejected all epistemologies individually for one reason or another. In doing so, he tried to organize his experiences with each into an empirically verifiable system that also explains the presence of suffering and injustice in the world. First, the Avida Vedanta philosophical tradition emphasized the literal truths about ultimate reality present in the Vedas, the Upanishads, and the Gitas. This derivation of all knowledge from the scriptural tradition represents the traditionalist school of epistemology in India at the time of Siddhartha. After devoting his life to learning everything that the traditionalists could teach him, Siddhartha decided that the knowledge in scripture did not include a sufficient answer to every moral question, nor did the metaphysics gain any substantiation in our experiences in the real world, especially when the believable experiences in the real world include suffering and mortality.

In investigating the other traditions, the second school of knowledge at the time, the rationalists, did not satisfy Siddhartha either. Although he appreciated the rationalists' reaction to the traditionalists inasmuch as they rejected any metaphysical speculation, Siddhartha found the rationalists' use of logical argument to derive all knowledge equally unsatisfactory. Sound reasoning cannot be a guarantee of knowledge because sometimes the conclusions fall apart given the real-world experience. Further, reason never approaches the goal of giving knowledge of the cause of certain kinds of real experiences, such as death and suffering in the world.

The third epistemology that Siddhartha followed for a time was the experiential school (or the empiricists), who proposed that the highest form of knowledge must come from practice, rather than just scripture or reason. Siddhartha's reaction was that achieving higher knowledge is a means to an end, and not an end in itself. From his own practice Siddhartha concluded that one will never answer certain moral questions (i.e. explaining suffering) with devotion and meditation alone. One must gain knowledge through the practice of rational understanding, moral behavior, and meditation and also through scripture study and reason in order to eventually find the enlightenment necessary to solve these moral questions. Siddhartha recognized the problems with adhering to any of the extreme epistemologies and originated his own "middle path" that combines the use of the three ways of gaining knowledge to accomplish a unified system of gaining knowledge without the shortcomings of each extreme alone.

Another example of Siddhartha's choosing the middle choice between extreme perspectives of the time has to do with the two viewpoints about causation prevalent at the time. The first, as given by the Avida Vedanta tradition, is the philosophy of self causation where some eternal force is the source of all, and all things come to be as a result of the plan that this perfect Brahman has for the universe. Siddhartha rejected this idea because, in studying this tradition, he was not able to empirically substantiate anything perfect or eternal, for all that he can possibly verify about existence is the impermanence (non-eternality, anicca), unsatisfactoriness (suffering, dukkha), and nonsubstantiality (no-self, anatman, or complete worldliness) of it. Whether or not we have an immortal soul, everyone's body and mind are mortal, so all we can ever verify is also imperfect and impermanent. We will thus never truly know in this life whether a universal truth is at the root of causation.

But the Buddha never accepted the other extreme, either. The theory of external causation, where all things are bound by the laws of nature beyond our control, cannot be true either, for then the concepts of praise and punishment become meaningless. If it is possible for a person to improve morally in the world, some kind of non-external causation must be at work. The Buddha thus syncretically concluded some important ideas about the irreconcilable speculations of the extreme schools of causality. His first conclusion is that our perspective is necessarily limited by our senses. People are not omniscient, and therefore we cannot understand the truth about causality without recognizing that we will never perceive all the causes or effects of any event. Nevertheless perception that there is a conditionality of effects on causes is perception of truth. Gaining knowledge also of the past actions and misconceptions that could condition our future actions represents the human free will. In other words, we are not bound by external causes, but many factors are out of our control, and we will never be able to predict future consequences certainly or perceive all causes. Because we cannot know all the causes or effects of an event, Siddhartha's theory of causation cannot represent an organization of all real experiences into a systematic whole. It can only serve to help one understand that there is a unification of causality in the world that is beyond our limited perception, and that suffering, then, must be subject to that causality. Regardless, the Buddha has found a syncretic approach to finding the common ground between the extreme belief systems on causality.

Finally, Siddhartha had to find the "middle path" between the ontologies of the metaphysical existence of perfection and eternity and the existential rejection of anything but the human perception and human mortal life. Siddhartha's skepticism of the metaphysical did not also discount the human necessity to rid oneself of the unsatisfactory aspects of life. His perception was, however, that there are two human mechanisms against suffering because of our mortality. The first human reaction against the reality of our mortality is attachment to the ideas that perfection and immortality are possible. The belief in the immortal soul (atman) and the One Perfect Cause (Brahman), then, regardless of whether these actually exist, creates an attachment to something unattainable in the real world. The fact is that we die, and acceptance of that fact may be the first step in escaping the consequences of it. When one is no longer striving for continuance of life after death, one is then free to work against suffering in the world as well as the psychological suffering that is caused by this selfish and hopeless striving for immortality.

The other human response to the inevitability of death is denial of the need to work to eliminate suffering in the world, based on the rationale that working against the inevitability of each human's demise is futile. This existentialism also has no place in the Buddhist philosophy for similar reasons. Both striving for immortality and existential denial of the significance of causation represent attachments to selfish desires and propagate suffering both psychologically and physically. As long as one continues in one's dispositions toward selfishness and attachments (either physical or metaphysical), one is not released from the world's suffering, but instead one's own suffering is reborn in the causation of suffering in the world. The ontological "middle path" thus neither speculates about metaphysics and life after death, nor discounts the necessity for the elimination of attachments because of the inevitability of death. Therefore, the Buddha's syncretic approach to ontology is the coherent organization of the empirically verifiable ideas from divergent and speculative philosophies into one experientially real whole.

To the Buddha, then, rebirthlessness is the goal, and one attains that goal by rational understanding, moral behavior, and practice of meditation. All activities that remove the attachments to permanence help one to organize one's experiences in terms of causation and eliminate suffering in the world. The ethics of early Buddhism, then, are simple. Elimination of dispositions and attachments to ideals of the eternal and metaphysical seem generally to promote psychophysical health and are thus viewed as good. Cravings, dogmas, inflexibility, etc. are dispositions which not only set oneself up for disappointment, but also tend to cause further self-destructive behaviors later and more suffering. Until one desists the propagation of suffering, the consequences of one's attachments and selfishness will continue their reign in the world according to the Buddhist theory of causation in the form of mankind's suffering (in other words, "bad karma"). This represents the simple organization of ethics in terms of real dispositions and actions and real consequences. Therefore, the philosophy as given by the Buddha represents an organization of real experiences into a systematic view of knowledge, reality, causation, ethics, and goals of life. In addition, it generally functions better with the model of philosophy as organized "real experiences" than previous philosophies in the Indian tradition because it never draws on metaphysical or unverifiable experiences for its organization or its conclusions. Early Buddhism, then, is certainly a coherent and succinct way of thinking if judged by the given definition of philosophy.

For more on Early Buddhism see: Kalupahana, David J. Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976.

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